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a face is a layout of cavities. It is by puncturing 
a sphere, a pumpkin, an arc, drawn with a 
careless stroke or a pool of light on the movie 
screen with dark holes that one makes a face.
—Alphonso Lingis
from the beginning it was never anything but chaos.
It was fluid which enveloped me, which breathed in 
through the gills . . .  in the substrata, where the moon 
shone steady and opaque, it was smooth and fecundating. 
Above all it was a jangle and discord . . .
—Henry Miller
Contemporary film theory is at an exciting crossroads. A tradition of ideological, 
sociological, cultural and libidinal concerns has left film theory devoid of attention 
to affectivity and the aesthetic. It seems that a cultural studies approach to film has 
rendered it a form of representational images and sounds through which to discern 
some overall sociological or ideological understanding of our realities. For ex­
ample, questions of representation have highlighted political debates around gendered
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subjectivities or have provided discourse around the politics of identity. Conse­
quently a cultural studies paradigm has primarily considered film a political form 
through which to critique and to challenge dominant ideological discourses to do 
with class, race, or gender. Similarly, within film studies itself, theories from psy­
choanalysis have been acknowledged as a paradigm through which to understand 
the pleasures and desires of the cinematic experience, specifically in relation to 
subjectivity and gendered identities. However, as I argue at length in Deleuze and 
Cinema: The Aesthetics of Sensation, such discourses have been premised upon 
binary thinking and structuralist linguistics, thus containing debate within the con­
fines of language and too often a phallocentric language and style which have main­
tained rational and logical argument through linearity. Furthermore, psychoana­
lytic debates have restricted understandings of desire and pleasure to psychical struc­
tures whereby subjectivity is explained through recourse to Freudian and Lacanian 
concepts. However, the pleasures and desires experienced through cinematic en­
counter may also lie outside the restrictions of a psychically constructed subjectiv­
ity. The aesthetic and material capture of the cinematic experience might better be 
understood through different trajectories that might be creatively explored through 
the auspices of philosophical discourse. My recent work, premised specifically on 
the continental philosophy of Gilles Deleuze and the neo-aesthetic, has offered a 
different understanding of the cinematic experience and a concern with “film-phi- 
losophy” where the aesthetic is rethought through recourse to Deleuzian concepts 
beyond structuralist linguistics. Indeed, language itself becomes part of an experi­
mental mode of assemblaged experience which this paper, too, playfully and cre­
atively mobilizes through its unique choreographical style.
Whilst I present a “different” thinking which choreographs rational and logical 
thought with creative and affective play and poetic style to consider film theory in 
my larger text on Deleuze and cinema, I also in this article stutter, dance, and play 
through the intricacies and delicacies of a choreographed space, to mobilize through 
language the spaces of the screen. Deleuze’s premise that language and psycho­
analysis have been too restrictive to account for affective temporalities and proto­
subjectivities offers instead the concept of the “abstract machine.” The “abstract 
machine” offers an approach to cultural analysis which is quite different from struc­
turalist linguistics. Deleuze conceives thought as an effect or process which par­
ticipates, colludes, and collides with other processes to make up what he refers to 
as a “machinic assemblage” (Kennedy, Deleuze and Cinema 23). These processes 
function with other components, for example space, time, bodies, or matter. Thinking 
in this way distanciates the idea of language as based in a specific form of logic 
which can only be used in specific ways. This methodology then enables a move 
away from thinking about the cinematic experience as purely focused in the image.
Consequently, language which has contained meaning within binary strictures 
need no longer be prioritized in considering the material experience of the cin­
ematic. Film theory might take a lead from Deleuze by reconsidering language 
outside of dialectical thinking. For example, the mind/body dichotomy might be 
reconsidered as a machinic or assemblaged and technologized form enabling new 
configurations for thinking and feeling beyond structuralist positionalities.1 This
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paper, then, based upon an actual performance piece, also works as a technologized 
capture and it seeks to re-situate and re-configure corporeality and the corporealized 
experience of the cinema as body. This enables a resituating of the “body” through 
the spaces of our cultural, aesthetic, and material experiences: a space “between” 
in Deleuzian terms, the spaces of feminisms, philosophies, and critical theory. I 
shall do this through the application of such theoretical paradigms to popular cul­
tural formations, textual spaces, and bodies such as the cinema, fashion, and the 
material body. This is accommodated by refiguring texts as bodies, as machinic 
assemblages, by utilizing in a paradoxical non-Deleuzian way Deleuze’s concepts 
of faciality, the haptic, and haecceity. The ways in which we understand identities, 
affectivities, subjectivities, bodies, and texts—lived bodies and lived texts—through 
spaces, pleasures, sexuality, and desire are here transformed through new ways of 
thinking and new images of thought. Identities and subjectivities are destabilized 
through immanent processes of becoming. Identity is subsumed to a process of 
difference and repetition. Encounter is prioritized over recognition. This is par­
ticularly important to a re-evaluation of the cinematic experience as a material cap­
ture. I shall thus consider the implications of corporeality across the pleasurable 
spaces of the body, the facialized body, through film, fashion, and the city’s diora­
mas. Therefore, questions will concern problematizing subjectivities, identities, 
and requestioning corporeality and embodiment. The disembodied gaze of the 
cinematic viewer is aligned between the spaces of a corporealized and embodied 
observer. Corporeality and embodiment, the “bodies” of texts, humans, and ma­
chines, involve other bodies in technologized assemblage. There is no longer any 
definite separation of a field of reality, a field of representation, and a field of sub­
jectivity. Rather, in Deleuzian terms there is an integration across these previously 
disparate areas into an assemblage connected by a perceptual semiotics of the hap­
tic, the felt, and the synesthetic. The perceptual semiotic of the haptic is signifi­
cantly more resonant within my work both in this paper and in my wider discourse 
on machinic alignments and assemblage. This synthesizes with the ideas of Eliza­
beth Grosz, who argues that “[t]exts, concepts, do things, make things perform 
actions, create new connections, bring about new alignments. They are events . . .  
situated in social, institutional and conceptual space” (104).
My text here works as a nomadic text and an assemblaged machine to offer 
voices, spaces, images of thought, forces, sensations, and plateaus with which you 
will connect or not, feel or not; alignments which are created and experienced out­
side the confines of reason and logical discourse. It performs as a refrain, or think­
ing between, at an interstitial plateau. In Deleuze and Guattari the subject is not an 
“entity” between mind and body but is subsumed through and within a series of 
flows, energies, movements, and fragments which are capable of being linked in 
ways which do not lock it into identity. Subjectivity is relational and machinic. I 
want to show through this text, not an academic text but a performance in choreo­
graphed energies, how we can re-think the idea of proto-subjectivities beyond iden­
tity through the sensory and perceptual interface. This is the space between the 
zones of our cultural, material, and aesthetic formations: bodies, faces, cities, and 
spaces. I therefore mobilize rather than mediate, a synthesis of Deleuzian and
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Baudrillardian critique through an in-between and rhizomatic style. This 
technologizes plateaus of intensity across the vistas and screens of the cinematic, 
the body, and the molecularity of the material. Our experiences of cultural forma­
tions may lie outside the representational within the “machinic assemblage” be­
tween our bodies and other bodies. There is no longer any definable separation of 
a field of reality, a field of representation, and a field of subjectivity but as Deleuze 
indicates a connection between these previously disparate areas into an assemblage. 
This machinic assemblage is technologized by a perceptual semiotics of the haptic, 
the mimetic, the aleatory, and the synesthetic. Semiology itself is only one regime 
of signs according to Deleuze and it is not necessarily the most important or the 
most appropriate paradigm through which to understand our experiences (Deleuze 
and Guattari 111). The perceptual semiotic of the haptic and the neo-aesthetic are 
significantly more resonant within my work, both in this paper and in my wider 
research generally. This text “performs” without a subject as a range of variously 
formed matters, speeds, and intensities, allowing participation as expression and 
experience as aleatory or corporeal affect. It performs a choreography as a rhizomatic 
text, flowing through the cityscapes and bodies of contemporary cultural forma­
tions: T.V. music, dance, fashion, advertising, film—where these connect and as­
semble; where their own forces and intensities create new thoughts between, new 
feelings between, outside Cartesian patterns of logical discourse or structuralist 
linguistics. My text exists as a choreographed machine or an assemblage, connect­
ing and questioning concepts and ideology. The images of thought and represen­
tational tropes I shall discuss from cinema may lie outside ideology or they may not. 
Signification is deterritorialized across new mappings through different images of 
thinking, innovative perceptions, and creative mimesis. Semiotic chains are not 
only linguistic but operate outside and through the perceptual, the affective, the 
gestural, and the mimetic. How else does the language or material capture of film 
and the visual offer such jouissancial experiences? Such visual experiences—filmic, 
photographic, and digital—do not merely represent, but rather they form what 
Deleuze refers to as an “aparalletic evolution” between the representation, the im­
age, and the world.2 They operate as simulacra or molecular particles with which 
our bodies/minds relate, infuse, intensify, and connect as machinic assemblage. 
“Simulacra are like false pretenders, built upon a dissimilarity, implying an essential 
perversion or a deviation” (Deleuze, Logic of Sense 256).
If semiology is only one regime of signs we should return to pragmatics to 
utilize new concepts of thought outside of universality. In place of the sign the 
semiotic chain of the rhizome suggests that the question is not what a given sign 
signifies but “to” which other signs it refers. The rhizomatic agglomerates across 
diversities within language: the perceptive, the mimetic, the gestural, and cogni­
tive. Such signs create a network without beginning and without end as an “amor­
phous continuum.” “It is this amorphous continuum that for the moment plays the 
role of the signified but it continually glides beneath the signifier, for which it only 
serves as a medium or wall” (Deleuze and Guattari 112).
What we experience in cinematic and visual cultural formations is an 
atmospherization or a mundanization of the contents of the image. We experience
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a perceptual semiotic which is a haptic sense of “feeling.” This is not mediated by 
transcendental states of pleasure located through psychoanalytic regimes and sub­
jective modalities, but mobilized through immanent “becomings” and non-subjec- 
tive spaces of differential singularities of the material: what Deleuze refers to as 
“haecceity.”3 An haecceity can last as long and even longer than the time required 
for the development of a form and the evolution of a subject. In one specific se­
quence in the movie Blade Runner, the chase of Zhora by Deckard through the 
streets of L.A., our material encounter with the screen is grasped as a series of 
affective temporalities and sensibilities—a “becoming imperceptible” which appro­
priates a Dionysian inexhaustible will.
Blade Runner evokes Paul Virilio’s “overexposed city,” a hyperreality where 
geographic space implodes into screening interfaces. Depth, surface, space, and 
distance become “pure surface” in a reduction of space into time and a face-to-face 
encounter with terminal screens and terminal masks. Our own experiences of 
millennial consumerism, from Coca-Cola to Atari, interface with future configura­
tions. Our bodies interface with the city: New York cityscape—L.A. replicants. 
We move through molecular linkages of the chaotic mise en scenes both within the 
body of the film and our own bodies. The city, both in this film and in reality, 
becomes the screen for the body’s cultural saturations, a place/non-place where the 
body is recreated, technologized, transformed, contested, and re-inscribed. This 
re-orientates the sensory and the perceptual. The pleasures of the chase of Zhora 
sequence in Blade Runner emanate from a perceptual semiotic: the haptic sense of 
movement-image and affection-image. What I mean by this is that the visual image 
of movement, in this case Zhora running to escape Deckard, is also a “felt” experi­
ence, whereby the tactility of the image is perceived beyond a purely visual format, 
through an affective and aleatory space of perceived physical touch: a haptic (touch 
and sight collide) space of visuality and tactility. We are choreographed through 
the cartographies of the screen in a haptic dance where movement is a processual 
and durational transition from one form to another: from poses to movements in an 
immanent liquidity of affective temporality. Movement is both a mobile section of 
duration and yet it is also a transformation through space. In Bergsonian terms, 
vibration emanates from the duration of these movements (Deleuze, Cinema 7 56- 
61). Deckard searches for the identity of the snake-skinned creature, an image 
which was earlier framed, reframed, enhanced, and positioned as the image itself. 
This sequence exudes synesthetic pleasures in a haptic sensuality from the sequinned 
flesh of Zhora’s costume, erotically sensual, tactile, febrile, volatile—purveying a 
luminosity of shades, tones, and intensities across a mise en scene which is diffused 
with vaporized lighting and fluorescent highlighting. The warm air of the hair- 
bubble energizes the static fluidity of her body in the shower into an alien, erotic 
creature outside the human or the machinic: flesh against flesh, flesh against metal— 
a fluidity of silk against the rigidity of plastic. The cold cruelty of her metallic 
costume emphasizes the delicious delirium of her cool plastic raincoat against the 
alabaster flesh of her body. She tries to strangle Deckard, evoking the cyborgian or 
molecular woman such as we see in Mona of Romeo is Bleeding or Heddy in Single 
White Female . 4 Such cyborgian creatures exist beyond the confines of the Ma­
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donna/whore dichotomy as fin de siecle femmes of multiplicity and molecularity. 
Chaotic camera movements and a cacophony of musical sounds trace and vibrate 
the chase sequence through Virilio’s overexposed city: movement becomes en­
ergy—becomes vibration in molecularity. Textures, colours, and sounds connect 
and contrast with the fleshy fragility of Zhora’s body. Zhora, a fin de siecle femme 
and machinic cyborg, has similar simulations in several sequences in science fiction 
movies. The perfection of her body is more than rea l. . .  hyperreal. Her marked 
and pierced skin exudes the scarification of Bataille’s excess through libidinal cathexis. 
The ultimate penetration of flesh by glass produces a symbolic penetration of the 
image “outside” of representation. What is evinced is an example, not of desire as 
libidinal through psychoanalytic configurations, but desire as processual, as move­
ment, process, and immanence—movement-image. As Bergson indicates in Mat­
ter and Memory, image equals movement and every image is indistinguishable from 
its actions and reactions. This is universal variation:
My body is an image, hence a set of actions and reactions. My eye, my brain, are 
images, parts of my body. How could my brain contain images since it is one 
image among others? External images act on me, transmit movement to me, and I 
return movement: how could images be in my consciousness since I am myself 
image, that is, movement? And can I even, at this level, speak of “ego,” of eye, of 
brain and of body? Only for simple convenience; for nothing can yet be identified 
in this way. It is rather a gaseous state. Me, my body, are a set o f molecules and 
atoms which are constantly renewed. (Deleuze, Cinema 7 58)
Thus, if we consider this set of images in Blade Runner as a plane of immanence, 
the image itself is matter just as the body is matter. Movement and rhythm create 
the pleasures of a corporeal and embodied gaze. The dissipated lighting, repeti­
tious shapes, sounds, and colours create an alien world of pleasurable sensuality. 
Zhora’s escape through the screen of her simulacrum through to the other side 
technologizes an escape from representation beyond image into the movement- 
image and affection-image. There is a pedagogy of the image whereby it is not just 
something that is actually “seen.” As Deleuze indicates in Cinema 7, it is also 
legible and felt. In such a deterritorialization of the image the frame provides the 
lines of flight through which the perceptual and the haptic are choreographed. This 
affection-image is therefore a deterritorialized image, effectuated through a collu­
sion of atoms and light going beyond representation and identity. Deleuze dis­
cusses how affection is “what occupies the interval” (65). This interval lies be­
tween perception of the image and a proceeding hesitant action. In Bergsonian 
terms it is a coincidence of subject and object. A result of this coincidence is a 
feeling of movement as a lived state and as a specific quality of duration. Some 
element of movement is absorbed and refracted by the perceptive centers of the 
subject/object of the representational image. Images are thus not just visual rendi­
tions of the world, but they are mobilizations through tiny cellular movements of 
our worlds and bodies. Following Spinoza, the body might be regarded neither as 
a locus for the conscious subject nor as an object. Rather, the body can be seen in 
terms of what it can do, the things it can perform, the linkages and machinic con­
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nections it forms: the body in becoming and in affirmation. Following a strongly 
Spinozist line, Grosz says, “ Bodies are not defined by their genus and species, nor 
by their organised functions but by what they can do, the affects they are capable of 
in passion and in action” (187-213).
Desire emanates across the chase sequence in Blade Runner, not from the purely 
visual but from a vertiginous viscerality of filmic image as movement/assemblage; 
the film as body where bodies in movement evoke machinic energies. Desire is not 
fixed or located within a representational space, neither is it abyssal or negative as 
we see in psychoanalysis. Desire is what makes things, forges connections, creates 
relations, produces machinic alignments. The clone’s (Zhora and the spectator) 
isolated psychoanalytic abyssal positioning is projected differently—through im­
manence—by virtue of movement and rhythm. Desire is a processual effectuation 
rather than specific satisfaction. It is an aleatory and processual duration. A liquid 
perception in this sequence is created by virtue of a simultaneity of movements/ 
rhythms and performativities: a materiality composed of waves and molecules. 
The pleasures of the visual are corporealized through the duration and affective 
temporalities of the movement-image/affection image. The snow evokes a material 
and liquid perception, a rhythm which transports our bodies through the viscosity 
and viscerality of the sequence, through the screen, the glass, the image, and be­
yond. Thus the movement goes beyond a specific image to its material energic 
movement, from liquid perception to gaseous perception (Deleuze, Cinema 1 84). 
The power of rhythm is considered to be deeper than that of vision or audition. In 
an article on sensation, Dana Polan writes that “beyond figuration and representa­
tion sensation comes from a pure power that overflows all domains and traverses 
them. This power is that of Rhythm, which is deeper than vision, audition, etc . . .  
a logic of the senses that is as Cezanne says, ‘non-rational, non-cerebral’” (240). 
Filmic shots themselves become rhythmical durations and fractured cellular bodies. 
“The filmic shot becomes pure movement where all surfaces are divided, truncated, 
decomposed, like the thousand faceted eyes of an insect” (Deleuze, Cinema 1 23). 
As Deleuze continues, “the perspective of the outside is the perspective of the 
inside, a multiple perspective, shimmering, sinous, variable and contractile, like the 
hair of a hygrometer” (23). Thus there is what we might consider to be some 
fracturing into a “hystericization” or a dissimulation of subjectivity; a subjectivity 
that is broken, fragmented, traversed, and even subsumed through intensities and 
energies. Deleuze acknowledges that concepts are physical operations working as 
an abstract machine and not just ideal abstractions. Therefore, his discussion of 
force, energies, and intensities is a materialized one. Such fracturing of forces and 
energies in painting, for example, is based upon direct intensities of contraction, 
vibration, and resonance in a sensation of colours, lines, shapes, tones. This is a 
form of hystericization and is similarly operative in a material filmic experience and 
also in our corporeal and physical experience of spatial zones, such as the cityscape 
and pleasure zones of dance culture.
The night club experience of millennial urban cityscapes certainly exudes the 
pleasures of abjection, through the pleasureable and desirous spaces theorized 
through a psychoanalytic framework. However, music, sounds, colour, and shapes
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also connect beyond the psychoanalytic regime of libidinal cathexes, through deeper 
rhythmical, kinesthetic, and synesthetic intensities; a body of lines and colours like 
paintings liberated from any organic representations. Indeed, in the club scenario, 
both in filmic diegeses and in reality, music captures the chromatic intensities of 
painting, film, and movement. The synesthetic derives from the material encounter 
with several elements rather than one force. The colours of the night club cyberscape 
provide the modulations of synesthetic pleasures. The jouissancial experience of 
the club scene is prevalent in the chase sequence described and several other se­
quences from Blade Runner. The jouissancial experience of trance-dance emanates 
all of the haptic visions. Colorism does not, according to Deleuze, “consist only of 
relations of hot and cold, of expansion and contraction, that vary in relation to the 
considered colours. It consists also of the regimes of colour, of the connections 
between the regimes, of the accords between pure tones and broken tones . . . 
haptic vision is precisely this sense of colours” (Polan 252). This hapticity is both 
optic and tactile; the visual becomes felt. The felt connection between eye and 
hand is felt as a coagulation of sight and touch.
In the sequence I have just discussed, viscerality enhances abjection. The hor­
ror and melancholy of Zhora’s body, eviscerated, dissipated, tom, and bloody . .. 
destroyed by fragments and shattering shards of glass,which like the ashes blown to 
the wind, disintegrate, “become imperceptible,” as a valorization of spectacle, waste, 
excess, and defilement. The scene epitomizes the jouissancial pleasures of excess, 
ritual, and death, as we again see later in Priss’s bloody death. Batty’s replicant 
pain, alien in its human and machinic proclivities, is camivalized through the abomi­
nations of a machinic body which is eviscerated as flesh and blood. The sequence 
evokes the writings of Celine, who according to Kristeva speaks from “inside” the 
horror (149). Kristeva’s love of Celine, whose narratives are a form of hyperrealism, 
is exemplified by the passage she quotes from his novel Death on the Instalment 
Plan, which is specifically appropriate to Batty in Blade Runner: “He sticks his 
fingers into the wound . . . .  He plunges both hands into the m eat. . .  he digs into 
all the holes . . .  he tears away the soft edges . . .  he pokes around. . .  he gets stuck 
. . . .  His wrist is caught in the bones . . . .  Crack!” (560).
Are fin de siecle femmes merely simulacra? What signs can we take from their 
hyperreal configurations into other regimes: political, familial, cultural, and sexual? 
The signs within the film and this sequence in particular connect with the fantasies 
of our realities. This is a Baudrillardian world of fashion, costume, and the mas­
querade, the tactility and sensuality of the post-modern, where the marked body 
and the pierced body exist in and of themselves, visceral, symbolic, an enchanted 
fairytale, where the deja vu of an earlier time evokes the eternal return of Nietzsche’s 
Dionysian will-to-power. Such signs circulate and spiral into other zones of our 
experiences: personal, familial, social, libidinal, and cultural formations. Every­
thing is connected in a chaosmotic assemblage of machinic intensities. All elements 
have singularly differential relations within a continuum of those spaces. Instead of 
the body as representation, the body becomes locomotion.
Deleuze and Guattari indicate that the pure redundancy of the signifier could 
not even be conceptualized if it did not have its own form of expression, what they
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refer to as “faciality.” This concept is located within the mobilities of affectivity. 
When our bodies absorb the movements of the screenic images instead of reflecting 
them, our activity can be described as “effort,” or in Bergsonian terms “affect.” 
There is a definite link between affection and movement. It is through the concept 
of faciality that Deleuze articulates this connection (Cinema 1 88). This connection 
is discussed in Cinema 1 through the idea of the affection-image. The affect, or 
that by which we feel, is entity. Affect is that which describes feeling.5 But it is not 
an emotional state. Texts, visual or literary, have until recently been explained and 
theorized through signification. How can we begin to explain why theories of 
“affect” have currently become more significant to visual cultures, specifically film, 
than theories of signification if we are constrained to work within structuralist lin­
guistics. Affect has been a way of describing emotion. But there is a discernible 
difference between these two terms. Affect and emotion are conjoined but not 
synonymous. An “emotion” has a subjective element. A subject operates as the 
experiencer at an individuated level, as personal experience. It is crucial to Deleuzian 
ideas to theorize the difference between emotion and affect. Affect is not ownable 
by an individual agent in the same way as emotion (Massumi). How then can we 
critique affect if it is indiscernible to an agent, to a subject? Deleuze uses Spinoza’s 
“Ethics” to ground the term affect. Spinoza’s philosophy explores the difference 
between affect and emotion. Brian Massumi explains that according to Spinoza, 
affect has an irreducible bodily and autonomic nature. Affection is in fact a suspen­
sion of action-reaction circuits and linear temporality into what might be called 
“passion” (Massumi). Furthermore, according to Deleuze, affectivity exists within 
the molecularity of a material consilience across brain/bodies and proto-subjective 
intensities. Affect can be defined as an emotionless state but still a state of feeling. 
Affection-images, then, are entities. Entities are events of molecularity, so that 
affectivity resides beyond any subjective space within the pre-singularities of a proto- 
subjective state. This proto-subjective state is a state of differential speeds and 
movements or what Deleuze refers to as singularities, which function through a 
complex mechanism of differences and repetitions of molecular movements. We, 
as humans, are composed of elements, such as water, air, or earth, and affective 
intensities are effectuated through the transitional zones of repetitions of tiny, cellu­
lar, and molecular resonances.6 Affects, then, are events and cannot be described as 
emotions, although they are still feelings: thus the affection-image is effectuated 
through durational and processual entities and not through emotional identity. True 
entities are events, not concepts. What expresses entity is faciality or faceification 
of body/object.
In an analogous example, all language is accompanied by the durations of 
faciality traits. The face, as sociologists and art historians have written, has evoked 
discussions of emotional and passional regimes. Garbo’s face, to Roland Barthes, 
is a case in point. The “face” is also a body: the body a “face” in Deleuzian 
paradox. The “face” culturally, sociologically, and historically has been of great 
interest from psychoanalysis to psychologists, from Freud to Isakower and Spitz. 
Deleuze and Guattari see the face as part of a system where the head is included in 
the body but the face is not. “The face is a surface: facial traits, lines, wrinkles;
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long face, square face . . .  the face is a map . . .  the face is produced only when the 
head ceases to be part of the body” (170). In the film Seven, the horror of the 
impact when the “head” is discovered and positioned in a small square box, re­
moved from its body, lies in its final epitomization of “face” which in this film 
involves a range of emotional, moral, and ethical confrontations for Brad Pitt. His 
effacement by the killer makes him “face-up” to his own moral and ethical dilem­
mas and paradoxes. Across all semiotic systems what lies at their center, at their 
intersection, is the face. “A broadface with white cheeks” (Deleuze and Guattari 
167) . . . white clown, white mime, angel or . . . Priss? The screen, cinematic 
screen, or televisual screen may also be the face, the face the screen, since the face 
constructs the plane that the signifier needs to mobilize across other sign regimes in 
aparalletic evolution. The face creates the wall, the frame, and the screen. Conse­
quently, in cinema the filmic images of fin de siecle femmes become screens of 
simulacra or masks. The mask does not conceal the face, it becomes the face. The 
frame of the screen itself then becomes “mask.” As fin de siecle creatures of cyborgian 
assemblage, we millennial beings exhibit, wear, or inhabit a multiplicity of faceless 
masks, heteronyms, and strange personae. We become pure simulacra when we 
enter into the immanent planes of the aesthetic, outside of the real, but also more 
than real. The dream-scape delights of an immaterial life permeate the advertising 
images we see on T. V. selling us lipsticks, cars, clothes, or the naked faces of our 
“selves.” The dream is simulacrum: felt, haptic, and corporeal but not representa­
tional. It’s happening outside . . . .  The music is “outside.”
Who is Rachel? What is she? A fin de siecle femme? The femme-fatale is an 
icon of the problematic, never what she seems, consistently a simulacrum, a threat 
outside of the legible. The fin de siecle resonates through the works of Theophile 
Gautier (and Gaultier?), with Baudelaire and artists such as Gustave Moreau and 
Rossetti providing icons of the decadent. We see an example when we first experi­
ence Rachel in long shot floating towards Deckard, an image of decadence utilized 
and appropriated by advertising images for perfumes like Chanel. This effectuates 
the hedonistic, the symbolic, and Art Nouveau in a persistent icon of modernist 
configurations. How can she also be post-modern? But paradox is sense and sense 
is also paradoxical. The fin de siecle femme is between the modem and the post­
modern, in the interval and thus affective space of the machinic and the human. 
Through her decadence, excess, and simulations she moves away from the conflation 
of Freudian modernity through new post-modern figurations of simulacra, new media, 
and new technologies. The fin de siecle moment is the moment when masculinity 
loses access to the body, while woman comes to over-represent or, I would argue, 
to stand “outside” representation at all, in a fugitive space between the interstitial 
discourses of modernity and postmodemity. As we previously saw in the earlier 
discussion of the clip with Zhora, the image is not representational but exists in 
movement through a plane of immanence, not transcendence. The image does not 
exist outside its movement in/through time and the durationality of affective tem­
poralities. I refer the reader again to the earlier quote from Bergson. Whether 
replicant, alien, or human, Rachel in Blade Runner is both material and immaterial: 
she masks a range of multiple forces and flows, fin de siecle frissons of faceless
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chimeras: imperceptible, molecular, outside representation. In one particular se­
quence we see her searching in vain for the mask through which to encapsulate the 
faceless zone of her imperceptibility, her anonymity. In the movie Single White 
Female, both Ally and Heddy synthesize the unidentifiable selves across similar 
masks and personae, one never conceding to the other, a construal of fluidity. Rachel 
is an unfounded pretension concealing a dissimilarity. Just as Bridget functions in 
the film The Last Seduction, Rachel operates “not” as representational image but as 
pure simulacrum in locomotion. She searches in vain for the right mask . . . but 
there is none . . . she is both mask and screen and so much more. Deleuze and 
Guattari write, “There is no unitary function of the mask except a negative one . . .
. Either the mask assures the head’s belonging to the body . . .  or the mask assures 
the erection, the construction of the face, the facialisation of the head and body: the 
mask is now the face itself, the abstraction or operation of the face. The inhumanity 
of the face” (181).
In one specific sequence, Deckard kisses Rachel. The “kiss.” Butterfly kiss . 
.. kiss of death, eternal kiss, kiss of the spiderwoman, spider, insect. . .  insectoid.
..  viroid, mantis religiosa. . .  mantis-machine . . .  Rodin’s kiss? The kiss already 
testifies to the integral unity of the face/mask and inspires within it the rest of the 
body; the facialized body (Deleuze, Cinema 1 99). Rachel says, “Kiss me . . .  put 
your hands on me.” The tactility and sensuality of his kiss are facialised through her 
body outside of the mask beyond the simulacrum of her face, a contamination of 
erotogenic zones in aparalletic evolution. “Desire disperses from the Metropolis, 
but there is no becoming without the wasp and the orchid.”
There is no close-up of the face. The close-up is the face, but the face precisely in 
so far as it has destroyed its triple function— a nudity of the face much greater than 
that of animals. The kiss already testifies to the integral unity of the face and 
inspires in it the micro-movements that the rest of the body hides. But, more im­
portantly, the close-up turns the face into a phantom, and the book of phantoms. 
(Deleuze, Cinema 1 99)
The face is a horror story! Phantom face. . .  vampire. . .  volcanic voracities, the fin 
de siecle femmes like Rachel, Zhora, Priss, Bridget in The Last Seduction, and 
Mona in Romeo is Bleeding—moi?—project the dilemma of fragmented, disturbed, 
destratified, and desubjectified femininities, disorientated through a cultural elan 
which bifurcates woman’s subjectivity into a range of molecular sexualities outside 
of gender and beyond identity. Mona in Romeo is Bleeding epitomizes this mo­
lecular sexuality.
The contemporary millennial city scintillates with music, dance, and the plea­
sures of fashion, music style, and commodified desires. Cultural theorists valorize 
the hedonistic pleasures of the gourmet of the city’s delights; a garden of Earthly 
Delights. The film Pret-a-Porter portrays fashion as social phenomenon, a satirical 
treatment of the grotesque and the bizarre whilst paradoxically a kaleidoscopic 
beatification of the sensuousness and viscerality of silk and satin, from Nietzsche’s 
Salome to Schiaperelli. The film exudes a world obsessed with the “image.” But
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there is no image. All is movement-image, temporality, and matter. European and 
Hollywood cinema have a tradition of films which have explored the fashion world, 
from Resnais’ Last Year at M arienbad  to Antonioni’s Blow Up. The supermodels 
of our new millennium now play the same kind of role as the movie stars of ‘20s 
cinema, as couture videos take their place on MTV. In the contemporary world of 
fashion, supermodels are clones. Black faces are whitened to highlight the lumi­
nosity of lipsticks. Hair is coloured and styled across an eclecticism of fantasies. 
An array of fragmentary, ossified, and destratified personae, such clones are 
simulacra, not copies of the real, not images but simulations of imagined and imagi- 
nal bodies. Such bodies connect, intensify, and reterritorialize across other bodies 
and other zones in an assemblage of machinic connections and intensities. Post­
modern fashion with its eclectic and bricolaged mosaics of styles, textures, and 
periods, provides a collage of nostalgia which has indicated a desperate attempt to 
appropriate the past. But there is no history. There is only the present. . . this 
mapping of desires ossifies a genealogical desire for the trees! The seduction of 
postmodern style valorizes the simulacrum in a paradoxical Baudelairean and 
Baudrillardian celebration of macquillage, artifice, and ritual. Pret-a-Porter  pro­
vides a deconstruction and celebration of the system of fashion, replacing it by a 
symbolic exchange in a valorization of Bataille’s “paroxysms of exchange”: festi­
val, waste, death, and the profane. The signs of the fashion world spiral into ver­
tiginous arenas in a Deleuzian assemblage with other signs outside the linearity of 
time across the circularity of the eternal return. As Baudrillard writes, fashion is 
“the inexorable investment of every domain by the code” (,Symbolic Exchange and 
Death  87), and it enables the “simulation of the innocence of becoming” (89), the 
pleasures and desires of abjection and death, through “the enchantment of simula­
tion, the code and the law” (95).
Pret-a-Porter shows us bodies in street style: Bond Street. . .  Camden Lock. 
The contemporary cultural “body” is a body which is marked, written on, pierced, 
be-jewelled, machinic, and tribal, where bodily signs operate relationally with oth­
ers beyond signification. Some sequences articulate a Baudrillardian order of 
simulacra, the third order of simulacra, where signifiers do not relate in significa­
tion but to other signifiers, in process, immanently not transcendentally. Significa­
tion is denied and subverted. In Seduction, as Douglas Kellner expounds, Baudrillard 
substitutes symbolic power for real power, rethinking notions of the political and 
the libidinal economies of Marx and Freud with the “catalystic impulse” of seduc­
tion in a passion for game, ritual, and artifice. This is effectuated beyond restrictive 
economies of signification and psychoanalysis through the attraction of the void. 
In aparalletic evolution with this perspective one could posit a Deleuzian “machinic 
desire” as immanence through a Spinozist love of passion through movement, force, 
and intensity, not through appearance and representation. In Seduction , the mask, 
the macquillage, the face, the “visage” but also the body as face, the facialized 
body, becomes part of the seduction through a radical metaphysics of appearance, 
not through representation. Seduction valorizes the simulacrum in a Baudrillardian 
celebration of macquillage. The facialized bodies of fin de siecle femmes become 
visceral, immanent, and haptic as part of the seduction which threatens the politics
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of production. Baudrillard’s argument opposes seduction to production through 
the third order of simulacra: the simulation. Here, “cloning makes possible an 
extension and multiplication of the body, which transforms the very nature of the 
body, sexuality and human being itself’ (Kellner 100-101). The clone pervades our 
popular cultural spaces. The supermodel epitomizes the facialized body of millennial 
clones. Clones become part of the ritual of games in narcissistic hypostasis. The 
clone is the materialization of the genetic formula in human form. “The digital 
Narcissus replaces the triangular Oedipus. The hypostasis of an artificial double, 
the clone will henceforth be your guardian angel, the visible form of your uncon­
scious and flesh of your flesh, literally and without metaphor*' (Baudrillard, Seduc­
tion 235). The clone marks the end of the Oedipal scenario; father and mother have 
disappeared to the profit of a matrix called a code. The facialized body becomes 
the clone in the end of the human body as we have known it, into the cancerous 
metastasis of a post-modern narcissism.
In the marginals or the in-between of Deleuzian and Baudrillardian critique 
perhaps we can begin to understand, experience, and reconsider the fin de siecle 
festival through facialization, faceification, vigagite. In the fin de siecle we live 
many worlds at once and only a post-modern, non-synchronic regime allows for the 
in-between spaces of our thinking, of our becoming, of our “living,” of our “lov­
ing.” In a non-Deleuzian but post-Deleuzian sense, the modernist writings of Miller, 
Baudelaire, Kerouac, Lawrence, the works of Gautier (not Gaultier) and Bacon 
have a non-synchronic significance to a paper which does not seek to “locate” and 
position theory but to energize, immanently, an assemblaged choreography of 
thoughts, intensities, and becomings. “If the face is a politics, dismantling the face 
is also a politics involving real becomings, an entire becoming clandestine” (Deleuze 
and Guattari 188).
I quote, to end my article, from Henry Miller’s Tropic of Capricorn:
My eyes are useless, for they render back only the image of the known. My whole 
body must become a constant beam of light, moving with an ever greater rapidity, 
never arrested, never looking back, never dwindling. The city grows like a cancer.
I must grow like a sun. The city eats deeper and deeper into the red: it is an 
insatiable white louse which is eating me up I am going to die as city in order to 
become man again. Therefore, I close my ears, my eyes, my mouth. (121-123)
Notes
1. For a discussion of assemblage, see Barbara M. Kennedy and David Bell, The 
Cybercultures Reader.
2. “Aparalletic evolution” is a term in Gilles Deleuze and Claire Pamet’s Dialogues. 
Deleuze expresses the concept of “aparalletic evolution” as the “becoming” that exists between 
two contrasting matters:
There are no longer binary machines: question/answer, masculine/feminine, man/ 
animal, etc. This could be what a conversation is, simply the outline of a becoming.
The wasp and the orchid provide the example. The orchid seems to form a wasp-
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image, an orchid-becoming of the wasp, a double capture, since “what” each 
becomes changes no less than that which “becomes.” The wasp becomes part of 
the reproductive organs at the same time as the orchid becomes the sexual organ of 
the wasp. One and the same becoming, a single block of becoming, aparallel 
evolution of two beings, which have nothing whatsoever to do with one another.
(2)
3. For a discussion of how film theory has premised desire and pleasure through 
psychoanalytic regimes of a transcendent subject and how Deleuze enables a different 
conception of desire through the concept of “haecceity,” see Barbara M. Kennedy, Deleuze 
and Cinema: The Aesthetics of Sensation.
4. See Barbara M. Kennedy, “Post-feminist Futures in Film Noir.”
5. For a detailed discussion of affect, see Barbara M. Kennedy, Deleuze and Cinema: 
The Aesthetics of Sensation.
6 . See Barbara M. Kennedy, Deleuze and Cinema: The Aesthetics of Sensation, for a 
detailed exploration of proto-subjectivities and singularities.
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